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Abstract 
 
In a recent debate about the nature of scientific progress, Alexander Bird and Darrell Rowbottom 
have argued for two competing accounts of progress. According to Bird, scientific progress 
consists in the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Rowbottom, on the other hand, thinks that 
truth alone is necessary for progress. Both use thought experiments and appeal to intuitions in 
support of their views, and it seems fair to say that the debate has reached an impasse. In an 
attempt to avoid this stalemate, I propose to abandon appeals to intuitions and turn to scientific 
practice instead. I propose to examine the institution of the Nobel Prize, where scientists award 
their peers for what they consider to be important contributions to science, in order to shed new 
light on the question of scientific progress. I discuss two case studies that illustrate the way in 
which scientists make judgments about progress. As far as scientists are concerned, progress is 
made when scientific discoveries contribute to the increase of scientific knowledge of the 
following sorts: empirical, theoretical, practical, and methodological. I then propose that we 
should articulate an account of scientific progress that does justice to the way in which scientists 
evaluate progress. I discuss one way of doing so, namely, by abandoning the distinction between 
‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’ and granting that know-how counts as scientific knowledge. 
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1. Introduction 
 
According to Chang (2007, p. 1), “Scientific progress remains one of the most significant issues 
in the philosophy of science today.” This is partly because it seems rather odd to deny that 
science is making progress, but it is difficult to articulate in what sense exactly science is making 
progress. Recently, Bird (2007) has argued for an account of progress that has a rich tradition. 
According to Bird (2007, p. 64): 
 
Science (or some particular scientific field or theory) makes progress precisely when it 
shows the accumulation of scientific knowledge; an episode in science is progressive 
when at the end of the episode there is more knowledge than at the beginning. 
 
As Bird admits, this conception of scientific progress is not new. The idea of the growth of 
knowledge looms large in the history of science, at least from the early modern period. It may be 
traced back to Francis Bacon, whose Instauratio magna (1620) frontispiece declares: “Multi 
pertransibunt et augebitur scientia.”1 Sarton (1927, I, pp. 3-4) expressed a similar idea as 
follows: “The acquisition and systematization of positive knowledge is the only human activity 
which is truly cumulative and progressive.” However, as Bird notes, it seems that philosophers 
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 The Hebrew passage in Daniel 12:4 reads “many shall wander, and knowledge shall increase.” 
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of science have ignored this conception of scientific progress, at least since the publication of 
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Similarly, Kitcher (2002, p. 385) observes that: 
 
Almost everybody seems to agree that the sciences constitute the richest and most 
extensive body of human knowledge, and scientists routinely talk of “what we now 
know.” Within the philosophy of science, however, there is little explicit discussion of 
scientific knowledge. 
 
Bird (2008, p. 279) distinguishes between epistemic and semantic accounts of scientific 
progress as follows: 
 
(E) An episode constitutes scientific progress precisely when it shows the 
accumulation of scientific knowledge. 
 
(S) An episode constitutes scientific progress precisely when it either (a) shows the 
accumulation of true scientific belief, or (b) shows increasing approximation to 
true scientific belief.
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By considering several thought experiments, Bird (2007, p. 65) argues that “our intuitions about 
whether there is progress show that progress matches changes in knowledge, but not changes in 
truth,” and that (S) “has no theoretical advantages over” (E). 
 
Against (S), Bird (2007) propounds the following arguments, which show that cases of 
increase in truth, without justification, are not cases of progress. In other words, increase in truth 
alone is not sufficient for progress. 
 
1. A sequence of lucky guesses or irrational beliefs with increasing verisimilitude will be 
progressive on (S). Intuitively, however, and on (E), it is not. 
2. Suppose a scientific community accidentally forms approximately true beliefs based on 
an irrational method. One scientist realizes that the method is irrational, and the scientific 
community rejects its previously held beliefs. On (S), this community was making 
progress, and then regressed (after it was discovered that the method is irrational). 
Intuitively, however, and on (E), this community made progress after the discovery that 
the method is irrational. 
3. Suppose that we were to discover that there are entities answering to René Blondlot’s 
description of N-rays. On (S), this would be a case of progress because the belief is true. 
But Blondlot’s reasons for positing N-rays were entirely spurious and irrational, and 
hence not knowledge. (Apparently, his belief was largely the result of self-deception.) 
4. On (S), it would have been more progressive to have accepted Alfred Wegener’s theory 
of continental drift at the time. On (E), however, it was rational to reject it, or at least 
suspend judgment, at the time because Wegener didn’t have sufficiently compelling 
evidence in its support. 
 
According to Bird, these arguments show that increase in truth is not sufficient for progress. As 
Bird (2007, p. 65) writes: (S) “yields a verdict about progress in certain kinds of case [i.e., cases 
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 Proponents of (S) include Popper (1979) and Niiniluoto (1987). 
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of beliefs with insufficient epistemic support] that is at odds with our intuitions.” These 
intuitions, according to Bird (2007, p. 65), “imply that epistemic characteristics are essential to 
progress.” 
 
For Bird, then, there is progress in science whenever there is an increase in scientific 
knowledge. It is important to note that Bird does not take knowledge to be justified true belief. 
Rather, he thinks that his arguments support Williamson’s view that knowledge is a foundational 
concept in epistemology and that it does not have an analysis.
3
 According to Bird (2007, p. 85): 
 
A major feature of [Williamson’s] conception [of knowledge] is the view that belief aims 
at knowledge. It is as if we only have the concept of belief in order to describe the mental 
state we are in when we have attempted to know but have failed. While Williamson does 
not argue for this claim directly, the motivating role it plays in his overall conception 
means that the success of his arguments would strongly support that view. From this 
perspective, the arguments for the knowledge view of scientific progress can be seen as a 
contribution to the same project. 
 
It is also important to note that to say that knowledge is an unanalyzable primitive does not 
amount to denying that knowledge entails truth. As Williamson (2000, p. 3) writes: 
 
a necessary but insufficient condition need not be a conjunct of a non-circular necessary 
and sufficient condition. Although being coloured is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for being red, we cannot state a necessary and sufficient condition for being red 
by conjoining being coloured with other properties specified without reference to red. 
Neither the equation ‘Red = coloured + X’ nor the equation ‘Knowledge = true belief + 
X’ need have a non-circular solution. 
 
In other words, that p be true could be a necessary but insufficient condition for ‘S knows that p’ 
without it being the case that there is an analysis of ‘S knows that p’ in terms of ‘p is true’ plus 
some additional conditions. 
 
So, according to Bird, if belief aims at knowledge, then scientific belief aims at scientific 
knowledge. Progress in science would then be attaining knowledge rather than merely truth. This 
is another advantage of (E) over (S), according to Bird (2007, p. 83), not only because aiming at 
truth, unlike aiming at knowledge, does not entail that one desires to avoid falsehood as well, but 
also because knowledge is harder to achieve, and thus more stable than true belief.
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Contrary to Bird, Rowbottom argues against (E) and in support of (S). Rowbottom 
doesn’t share Bird’s intuitions about putative cases of progress. In his recent reply to Bird, 
Rowbottom (2010, pp. 242) provides the following thought experiment: 
 
Consider two planets; the inhabitants of the first have no justified scientific beliefs 
(although they have many true ones), whereas the inhabitants of the second have many 
justified scientific beliefs and considerable scientific knowledge. But the civilisations on 
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 See Williamson (1997) and (2000). 
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 Henceforth, I will take knowledge to be an unanalyzable primitive in the same way that Williamson and Bird do. 
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each of these planets appear, on the surface, to be equally as advanced. Each has 
developed similar technology, has similar societies and institutions, uses similar scientific 
theories, and so forth. Roughly, we’d say they were at the same stage of technological 
development as we were at the turn of the twentieth century. Now add that the people on 
each of the planets began in similarly primitive circumstances and proceeded without any 
outside interference. In short, neither group had an initial theoretical or technological 
advantage over the other, or acquired one from an external source. 
 
For Rowbottom, this thought experiment refutes (E), since his intuition is that the people on each 
planet have made some scientific progress (which need not be equal). This shows, according to 
Rowbottom, that scientific progress is possible without justification, and since knowledge entails 
justification, scientific progress does not consist in the accumulation of knowledge. 
 
Both Bird and Rowbottom, then, offer thought experiments and appeal to intuitions in 
support of their views, and it seems fair to say that the debate has reached an impasse. In an 
attempt to avoid this stalemate, I propose to study actual scientific practices rather than appeal to 
intuitions. In particular, I propose to examine the institution of the Nobel Prize in an attempt to 
shed new light on the question of scientific progress. I think that examining episodes from the 
history of the Nobel Prize might be illuminating as far as the question of scientific progress is 
concerned, since the Nobel Prize is a setting where scientists award their peers for what they 
consider to be important contributions to science. 
 
In what follows, then, I will examine (S) and (E) from a naturalistic perspective. Taking a 
naturalistic stance means articulating philosophical accounts about science that are historically 
informed. This idea is expressed by Imre Lakatos’ (1970, p. 91) paraphrase of a Kantian thesis: 
“Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science without 
philosophy of science is blind.” More than simply being historically informed, however, 
naturalistic accounts of science must also do justice to the actual practices of scientists. As Bird 
(2008, p. 73) puts it: 
 
even if one thinks of history of science as descriptive and philosophy of science as 
normative, the former can be relevant to the latter in that, given certain assumptions about 
science in fact satisfying the norms (e.g., science is largely rational), it had better be that 
the historian’s description meshes with the philosopher’s prescription. 
 
What this means, at a minimum, is that if we want to answer questions about the nature of 
science, such as “What is scientific progress?”, then we have to look at the history of science and 
the actual practices of scientists. As Leplin (1997, p. 99) writes: 
 
increasingly in epistemology, and especially in the philosophy of science, theories have 
been redirected toward methods of inquiry that can be empirically assessed for their 
utility in advancing cognitive goals without prejudice as to whether they are believed by 
practitioners to advance these goals, or whether they fit popular preconceptions as to 
what knowledge is or how it is acquired. This development abandons philosophy’s 
traditional claim to a priori status in favor of an essential continuity of philosophy with 
empirical science. 
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By taking a naturalistic stance, then, we abandon first philosophy; philosophy thus becomes 
continuous with science. Taking a naturalistic stance means that an account of scientific progress 
is itself a scientific hypothesis. As Leplin (1997, p. 102) puts it: 
 
The view that philosophical theories of science are to be judged against scientific 
practice, much as science is judged against natural phenomena, is a form of naturalism in 
epistemology. […] The idea is that epistemological theories actually are scientific 
theories, albeit of a highly abstract and general kind. Just as scientific theories are 
responsible to the workings of the natural world, a theory about the assessment of 
scientific theories is a theory about evaluative practice in science, and is responsible to 
this practice. According to naturalism, there is nothing else for it to be about, for there is 
no source of facts about how theories ought to be evaluated apart from scientific 
experience. 
 
Accordingly, just as scientific theories are responsible to the workings of nature, and are 
evaluated relative to natural phenomena, a theory about scientific progress is a theory about an 
evaluative practice in science, and is responsible to this practice. To paraphrase Quine, I wish to 
find out how (S) and (E) fare when they face the tribunal of scientific practice. To do so, I will 
discuss two case studies and then see how each account of progress can accommodate these case 
studies. 
 
2. Landsteiner’s Discovery of Blood Groups 
 
Karl Landsteiner (1868-1943) was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1930 
for his discovery of human blood groups. The Presentation Speech for the 1930 Nobel Prize in 
Physiology or Medicine was delivered by G. Hedrén, chairman of the Nobel committee for 
physiology or medicine of the Karolinska Institutet. In his speech, Hedrén (1930) recounted the 
reasons why Landsteiner’s discovery advanced the biomedical sciences: 
 
Landsteiner’s discovery of the blood groups […] has opened up new avenues of research 
in several branches of science and has brought with it important advances in the purely 
practical field. However, it is only recently that the scientific importance of Landsteiner’s 
discovery has been fully realized (my emphasis).
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According to Hedrén, Landsteiner’s discovery yielded practical applications in medicine as well 
as new methods that proved useful in other fields. For example, the purification techniques he 
used in his own research, i.e., techniques of purifying antibodies by dissociating them from 
antigens, were later used (and are still used today for some applications) in immunology 
(Landsteiner and Miller 1925). In addition (Hedrén 1930): 
 
In the field of genetics the discovery of the blood groups has also proved to be of 
importance from the point of view of methodology in the study of the hereditary 
transmission of other characteristics. [It] also prompted research on the question—
important for the study of constitution—whether other body cells in addition to 
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6 
 
erythrocytes, and in particular the germinal cells, can be differentiated according to 
specific groups (my emphasis). 
 
So, according to Hedrén, in addition to the medical applications that his discovery brought about, 
Landsteiner was awarded the Nobel Prize because his discovery also opened up new avenues of 
research in several branches of science and it proved to be important methodologically in the 
study of the hereditary transmission of other characteristics. 
 
In his Nobel Lecture, Landsteiner explained how new methods led to new discoveries. As 
Landsteiner (1930) said, “it was not the usual chemical methods but the use of serological 
reagents which led to an important general result in protein chemistry, namely to the knowledge 
that the proteins in individual animal and plant species differ and are characteristic of each 
species.”6 This general result helped Landsteiner in his experiments concerning the phenomena 
of agglutination, i.e., when mixing blood from two individuals can lead to blood clumping and 
the clumped red cells can crack and cause toxic reactions. Before Landsteiner, it was commonly 
believed that agglutination is a pathology. But Landsteiner showed that it was due to the unique 
nature of the individual’s blood. Blood clumping is an immunological reaction that occurs when 
the receiver of a blood transfusion has antibodies against the donor blood cells. He grouped 
blood types into three groups, which he designated as A, B, and C (which later became O and the 
AB blood group was subsequently added by others). Thanks to Landsteiner’s work, the first 
successful blood transfusion took place in Mt. Sinai Hospital in New York in 1907. 
 
3. Pavlov’s Work on the Physiology of Digestion 
 
In 1904, Ivan Petrovich Pavlov (1849-1936) received the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 
“in recognition of his work on the physiology of digestion, through which knowledge on vital 
aspects of the subject has been transformed and enlarged.” K. A. H. Mörner (1904), who 
delivered the Presentation Speech, opened his speech as follows: 
 
The medical sciences are mutually interdependent. Progress in one field is often closely 
associated with development in others. The rise in one branch of science can often have 
its origin in a recently made analysis within another sphere, and yet it may appear at the 
first glance that the former is of outstanding importance while the latter is apparently of 
second value. It is not always such progress, as immediately are useful and of benefit, 
which should be considered as especially important; this character can also be attributed 
to those which are themselves less spectacular but form the basis for the others which are 
then only a further development of it.
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According to Mörner, then, scientific discoveries are not sudden acts of creativity by isolated 
geniuses whose task is then simply to convince the scientific community that they have stumbled 
upon the truth (Zuckerman 1996). Also, discoveries that initially appear less spectacular may 
turn out to have great value. But what is the aim of science relative to which we make judgments 
about progress? According to Mörner (1904): 
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The aim of science is the acquisition of knowledge, the value of which should not be 
measured by the ease with which it can be brought immediately into practical usefulness 
(my emphasis). 
 
So the aim of science, according to Mörner, is the attainment of knowledge. Assessments of 
progress, then, must be made relative to this aim. As Mörner (1904) said: 
 
The importance of the activities of these men [i.e., Vesalius and Harvey] for the whole of 
Medical Science must be estimated from the contributions they gave to the advancement 
of knowledge (my emphasis). 
 
How was this aim achieved in the case of Pavlov? According to Mörner (1904): 
 
In the early days opinions on the course of digestion were speculations as to what was 
termed as ‘cooking’ or ‘grinding’ in the stomach, etc. So long as the digestive processes 
could not be observed or investigated directly in the stomach no real knowledge could be 
obtained (my emphasis). 
 
How did Pavlov help improve upon the state of knowledge in the field? According to Mörner 
(1904): 
 
An accident turned physiological research in this field in a direction which has later 
become very important. In the 1820’s a young man sustained a gunshot wound in the 
stomach and developed a gastric fistula which to some extent permitted the gastric 
processes to be studied. Observations were carried out on this man by the American 
physician W. Beaumont. This accidental path of investigation, allowing actual 
observation of processes taking place in the digestive tract, was later followed by many 
workers using animals. Technique is an important factor in such experiments and has 
been perfected in a masterly way by Pavlov, whose animals remain in good health, 
without any injury to the function of their digestive tract, permitting observation and 
systematic investigation over an almost unlimited period. 
 
According to Mörner, then, Pavlov made contributions not only in terms of factual knowledge 
about digestion but also in terms of methods and techniques of investigation. As Mörner (1904) 
put it: 
 
These methods for the study of the physiology of digestion established by Pavlov have 
been taken up by various physiological institutions, but above all much important work 
was performed in his own laboratory. From this has followed far-reaching transformation 
of our knowledge in this field which has also been enriched by new fundamental facts 
(my emphasis). 
 
Why Pavlov was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine? According to Mörner 
(1904): 
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Before Pavlov, knowledge in this field was in many respects very imperfect. Pavlov has 
corrected earlier erroneous opinions which were held even with regard to the main points 
within this part of physiology. He has further enriched it with significant data (my 
emphasis). 
 
Accordingly, in addition to contributions in terms of new methods and techniques of 
investigation (one, in particular, became known as the “chronic experiment,” involving intact 
animals), Pavlov corrected erroneous beliefs and added new factual knowledge about the 
physiology of digestion. What additional knowledge did Pavlov add to the field? According to 
Mörner (1904): 
 
Before Pavlov’s work it was the general opinion that the gastric secretion was not 
influenced via the nerves connecting the stomach and the central nervous system. This 
conception has, however, been shown to be incorrect. Pavlov has demonstrated that the 
vagus nerve linking the brain with various thoracic and abdominal organs contains fibers 
which during their activity stimulate gastric secretion and others which have an exactly 
opposite effect. In this way the secretion of gastric juice is controlled by the central 
nervous system and can be influenced from different parts of the body. 
 
So Pavlov exposed erroneous opinions and corrected them. Furthermore (Mörner 1904): 
 
Pavlov has enriched our knowledge of the significance and functions of this important 
nerve in other respects also. The vagus nerve paths are not, it appears, the only simulators 
of gastric secretion. Pavlov has shown that it may also be influenced through the 
sympathetic nervous system (my emphasis). 
 
Pavlov also added to the already existing, yet incomplete, knowledge about the vagus nerve. In 
addition (Mörner 1904): 
 
Pavlov has also demonstrated another aspect of the functional association between the 
gastric mucous and the nervous system, in the specific excitability of the mucous 
membrane itself. Before the work of Pavlov it was supposed that it could be brought into 
activity by almost anything within the stomach. Purely mechanical contact was 
considered to have this effect. Pavlov demonstrated, however, that this generally 
accepted view was incorrect. The reverse is true, the gastric mucous membrane having a 
sharply differentiated excitability for special substances with which it comes into contact. 
Thus there are relationships reminiscent of the specific excitability of the sense organs 
(my emphasis). 
 
In addition to showing that previously held beliefs were false and correcting them, Pavlov also 
contributed to physiology by adding new knowledge. According to Mörner (1904): 
 
It is now known, thanks to Pavlov, that a similar specific excitability is present in the 
mucous membrane lining the digestive tract, even though the subject is not conscious of 
it, and it acts by influencing the processes of secretion and of motility of the canal (my 
emphasis). 
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Furthermore (Mörner 1904): 
 
As another aspect of this specific sensitivity of the gastric mucous membrane one must 
consider the remarkable fact, demonstrated by Pavlov, that the amount of gastric 
secretion and its digestive strength show certain typical variations dependent upon the 
quality of the food taken. 
 
This is just a sample of the contributions to the knowledge of the physiology of gastric secretion 
and other aspects of the physiology of the stomach made by Pavlov (Mörner 1904). Being 
familiar with the full extent of his contributions, however, Pavlov’s colleagues could judge that 
(Mörner 1904): 
 
Through Pavlov’s work we have obtained a much more extensive and clearer insight than 
our previous knowledge could give us. We have now a fairly comprehensive view of the 
influence which the activity of one portion of the digestive apparatus can exert on 
another; in other words how the wheels of the digestive mechanism fit together for the 
efficient use and advantage of the body (my emphasis). 
 
Accordingly, Pavlov’s work on digestion was deemed a major contribution to the progress of 
physiology by his colleagues. In Pavlov’s case, the reasons include revising imperfect 
knowledge, correcting erroneous opinions, and devising new methods and techniques for the 
study of the physiology of digestion. These epistemic reasons, in terms of the rejection of false 
beliefs, correction of erroneous opinions, and addition of new knowledge, are the grounds for the 
judgment that “Pavlov’s work on digestion has been found to be of great importance for the 
study of disease, and undoubtedly the progress made in physiological knowledge in this case as 
well as in others will lead to a transformation of the concepts of diseases and their treatments” 
(Mörner 1904). For these reasons, Pavlov was awarded the 1904 Nobel Prize in Physiology or 
Medicine. 
 
In his Nobel Lecture on the physiology of digestion, Pavlov (1904) identified the 
following aim for physiology: 
 
Precise knowledge of what happens to the food entering the organism must be the subject 
of ideal physiology, the physiology of the future. Present-day physiology can but engage 
in the continuous accumulation of material for the achievement of this distant aim (my 
emphasis).
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After he surveyed the state of knowledge in the field before his contributions and explained how 
his contributions added to or corrected existing knowledge, Pavlov judged that the science of 
physiology “is making huge progress every day” (Pavlov 1904). 
 
4. Lesson from Scientific Practice 
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Taking (S) and (E) to be scientific hypotheses, as they should be understood from a naturalistic 
perspective, they yield specific predictions. According to (S), truth is the aim of science. So, 
assuming that scientists are aware of the goal they are pursuing,
9
 we would expect scientists to 
talk about the aim of science in terms of truth. As we have seen, however, this is not what we 
find. The case studies discussed above show that scientists talk about the aim of science in terms 
of knowledge rather than merely truth. This way of talking about the aim of science is further 
confirmed by what scientists say even beyond the setting of the Nobel Prize, which is what we 
would expect if (E) were true, since, according to (E), knowledge is the aim of science. Here are 
two examples: 
 
It is not in the nature of things for any one man to make a sudden violent discovery; 
science goes step by step, and every man depends on the work of his predecessors. When 
you hear of a sudden unexpected discovery—a bolt from the blue, as it were—you can 
always be sure that it has grown up by the influence of one man on another, and it is this 
mutual influence which makes the enormous possibility of scientific advance. Scientists 
are not dependent on the ideas of a single man, but on the combined wisdom of thousands 
of men, all thinking of the same problem, and each doing his little bit to add to the great 
structure of knowledge which is gradually being erected (Rutherford 1947, p. 178, my 
emphasis). 
 
[Science] is the accumulation of humanity’s organized, objective knowledge, the first 
medium devised to unite people everywhere in common understanding (Wilson 1999, p. 
269, my emphasis). 
 
From a naturalistic standpoint, then, one could make the following argument against (S): 
 
1. If (S) is true, then scientists would talk about that aim in terms of truth. [Assuming that 
scientists are thoughtful enough to reflect on the aim of their profession.] 
2. It is not the case that scientists talk about the aim of science in terms of truth. [As the 
aforementioned case studies show.] 
3. (Therefore) (S) is (probably) not true. 
 
Like any disconfirmation argument, this argument does not amount to a refutation of (S), even 
though it is formally valid. Proponents of (S) could always reject the assumption that scientists 
are cognizant of the aim of science, but then they would have to say why scientists, unlike other 
professionals, fail to understand the aim of their profession (see footnote 9). 
 
 On the other hand, one could make the following argument in support of (E): 
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1. If (E) is true, then scientists would talk about that aim in terms of knowledge. [Assuming 
that scientists are thoughtful enough to reflect on the aim of their profession.] 
2. Scientists talk about the aim of science in terms of knowledge. [As the aforementioned 
case studies show.] 
3. (Therefore) (E) is (probably) true. 
 
Like any confirmation argument, this argument does not amount to a demonstration that (E) is 
true, since it is formally invalid. Again, proponents of (S) could always reject the assumption that 
scientists are cognizant of the aim of science. But it does seem to provide some evidence in 
support of (E), since (E) can readily explain why scientists talk about knowledge as the aim of 
science, whereas (S) does not seem to be able to account for that. 
 
Furthermore, if (S) were true, we would expect scientists to evaluate progress in science 
relative to semantic criteria, i.e., criteria that have to do with truth alone, assuming that scientists 
can make judgments about what counts as progress in science.
10
 As we have seen, however, this 
is not what we find. The case studies discussed above show that scientists evaluate progress in 
science relative to epistemic criteria, i.e., criteria that have to do with knowledge, which is what 
we would expect if (E) were true. More explicitly, from the aforementioned case studies, and 
others like them, we can discern the following pattern, which seems to be the way scientists 
make judgments about progress: 
 
(PA1) Survey the body of knowledge B in field F at time t prior to discovery D. 
(PA2) Estimate what was known (B) in F at t. 
(PA3) Identify a lacuna, imprecision or error in B at t. 
(PA4) Spell out how D improved on B by adding new knowledge, correcting 
imprecision or exposing errors and correcting them. 
 
In Landsteiner’s case, a survey of the body of knowledge before his work reveals (a) a lacuna in 
terms of knowledge about the function of different proteins in different species, and (b) 
erroneous beliefs about the phenomenon of agglutination. Landsteiner corrected these erroneous 
beliefs and added new factual knowledge about the nature and function of blood clumping. 
 
In Pavlov’s case, a survey of the body of knowledge on the physiology of digestion 
before Pavlov’s work reveals (a) a lacuna in terms of knowledge about the function of the 
digestive canal, the salivary glands, the intestinal canal, gallbladder, and the role of the nervous 
system, and (b) erroneous beliefs about the function of the vagus nerve and gastric secretion and 
how the gastric mucous membrane is excited by mechanical contact. Pavlov corrected these 
erroneous beliefs and added new factual knowledge about the stimulation of gastric secretion by 
the vagus nerve and the sympathetic nervous system, the differential excitability of the gastric 
mucous membrane relative to various substances and a similar one in the case of the mucous 
membrane lining the digestive tract. For example, as a result of Pavlov’s work, it is known that 
                                                 
10
 Another kind of accounts of progress, which I will not discuss in this paper, is what Bird calls “Functional-
Internalist” (FI) accounts of progress. According to (FI), “An episode shows scientific progress precisely when it 
achieves a specific goal of science, where that goal is such that its achievement can be determined by scientists at 
that time (e.g., solving scientific puzzles)” (Bird 2008, p. 279). On (FI), progress can be assessed internally by 
scientists themselves. Proponents of (FI) include Kuhn and Laudan. 
12 
 
“stimulation of gastric secretion of acid and pepsin and stimulation of pancreatic secretion of 
digestive enzymes starts with the anticipation of the ingestion of a desirable meal and is 
mediated by input to the stomach and pancreas from efferent nerves of the vagus” (Wood 2004, 
p. 327). 
 
In addition to showing that scientists make judgments about progress that are based on 
epistemic criteria, rather than criteria that have to do with truth alone, the aforementioned case 
studies also show that scientists take progress to consist in the accumulation of knowledge of the 
following sorts: 
 
(EK) Empirical Knowledge: Empirical knowledge usually comes in the form of 
experimental and observational results. 
(TK) Theoretical Knowledge: Theoretical knowledge usually comes in the form of 
well-confirmed hypotheses. 
(PK) Practical Knowledge: Practical knowledge usually comes in the form of both 
immediate and long-term practical applications. 
(MK) Methodological Knowledge: Methodological knowledge usually comes in the 
form of methods and techniques of learning about domains in nature. 
 
In the case of Landsteiner’s discovery of blood groups, we have accumulation of knowledge of 
the following sorts: 
 
(EK) knowing that mixing blood from two human beings can lead to blood clumping or 
agglutination; knowing that the clumped red cells can crack and cause toxic 
reactions. 
(TK) knowing that blood clumping is an immunological reaction that occurs when the 
recipient of a blood transfusion has antibodies against that donor blood cells; 
knowing that there are distinct blood groups that can be classified according to the 
ABO and Rh systems (among others). 
(PK) knowing how to determine blood groups and type human blood; knowing how to 
carry out safe blood transfusions; knowing how to type dried blood stains in the 
investigation of crimes where blood stains are left at the scene (though, nowadays, 
there are other methods of typing, in addition to forensic serology, involving other 
body fluids and DNA). 
(MK) knowing how to purify antibodies to study immunological responses and allergic 
reactions (since antigens as diverse as bacteria, pollen grains, and foreign red 
blood cells trigger the synthesis of antibodies in the lymphoid tissue). 
 
As we have seen, Landsteiner was deemed worthy of the Nobel Prize because his discovery led 
to an increase not only in theoretical knowledge but also in practical and methodological 
knowledge. In other words, scientists judged that medical science advanced, due to Landsteiner’s 
work, not only because of the theoretical knowledge of blood types, but also because of the 
practical knowledge of blood transfusions and forensic serology, and the methodological 
knowledge of antibody purification. 
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In Pavlov’s case, his work on the physiology of digestion was judged to have been 
progressive in terms of theoretical and empirical knowledge: 
 
(EK) knowing that stimulation of gastric secretion of acid and pepsin and stimulation of 
pancreatic secretion of digestive enzymes starts with the anticipation of the 
ingestion of desirable food. 
(TK) knowing that stimulation of pancreatic secretion of digestive enzymes is mediated 
by input to the stomach and pancreas from efferent nerves (i.e., nerves that carry 
impulses away from the brain or spinal cord) of the vagus; knowing that the 
stimulation of secretion induced by connecting environmental stimuli with 
appearance of tasty food is a conditioned reflex. 
 
In addition, and equally important, Pavlov’s work was judged to have been progressive in terms 
of practical and methodological knowledge as well: 
 
(PK) knowing how to treat peptic and duodenal ulcer disease with selective vagotomy 
(in selective vagotomy, the branches of the vagus nerve to the gall bladder and 
pancreas are left intact; usually performed to reduce secretion of acid and pepsin 
by the stomach to cure a peptic ulcer); knowing how to treat gastric acid-related 
disorders with selective muscarinic receptor antagonists. 
(MK) knowing how to study the anatomy of conscious animals by using surgical 
techniques, such as the Pavlov gastric pouch. 
 
According to Wood (2004, p. 326), Pavlov believed that “chronic studies in surgically prepared 
conscious animals were most likely to yield new insights into the integrated physiology of organ 
systems in general and the digestive system in particular.” Before Pavlov, experiential 
physiologists worked mostly with anesthetized animals. Pavlov showed that “sequentially 
repetitive studies in surgically prepared conscious animals are most likely to advance knowledge 
basic to humans” (Wood 2004, p. 326). Since Pavlov, it has been a standard methodological 
principle in physiology that “we must understand the normal functioning of an organ in the alert 
animal, as well as its anatomy, histology, and cellular biology, to know disease” (Wood 2004, p. 
326). Wood (2004, p. 327) also notes that the Pavlov gastric pouch was crucial for “the 
discovery of the cephalic phase of secretion and its role in the aciticipatory preparation of the 
upper digestive tract for the ingestion of a meal.” 
 
As for practical knowledge, Wood (2004, p. 327) says that “the invention of the now-
obsolete selective vagotomy for treatment of peptic and duodenal ulcer disease in humans in the 
1930s and the successful pharmacological development of selective muscarinic receptor 
antagonists as therapy for gastric acid-related disorders emanate from Pavlov’s discovery.” In 
addition, “modern knowledge of the action of histamine as a powerful gastric acid secretagogue 
evolved directly from Pavlov’s physiology factory” (Wood 2004, p. 327). Using Pavlov’s 
techniques of surgical preparation of gastric fistulas in dogs, Pavlov’s student, L. Popielski, 
“reported in 1916 that injection of histamine stimulated copious secretion of gastric acid in dogs 
with surgically prepared gastric fistulas” (Wood 2004, p. 327). 
 
From a naturalistic standpoint, then, one could make the following argument against (S): 
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1. If (S) is true, then scientists would evaluate progress based on criteria that have to do 
with truth alone. [Assuming that scientists are thoughtful enough to reflect on the aim of 
their profession and make judgments about whether or not that aim is attained.] 
2. It is not the case that scientists evaluate progress based on criteria that have to do with 
truth alone. [As the aforementioned case studies show.] 
3. (Therefore) (S) is (probably) not true. 
 
Like any disconfirmation argument, this argument does not amount to a refutation of (S), even 
though it is formally valid. Proponents of (S) could always reject the assumption that scientists 
are cognizant of the aim of science and can make judgments about the attainment of that aim, but 
then they would have to say why scientists, unlike other professionals, fail to understand the aim 
of their profession (see footnote 9). 
 
 On the other hand, one could make the following argument in support of (E): 
 
1. If (E) is true, then scientists would evaluate progress based on epistemic criteria. 
[Assuming that scientists are thoughtful enough to reflect on the aim of their profession 
and make judgments about whether or not that aim is attained.] 
2. Scientists evaluate progress based on epistemic criteria. [As the aforementioned case 
studies show.] 
3. (Therefore) (E) is (probably) true. 
 
Like any confirmation argument, this argument does not amount to a demonstration that (E) is 
true, since it is formally invalid. Again, proponents of (S) could always reject the assumption that 
scientists are cognizant of the aim of science and can make judgments about the attainment of 
that aim. But it does seem to provide some evidence in support of (E), since (E) can readily 
explain why scientists evaluate progress relative to epistemic criteria, whereas (S) does not seem 
to be able to account for that. 
 
On (S), we get the following picture of science. The scientific enterprise is a truth-aiming 
enterprise. That is, the aim of scientific inquiry is truth. Scientists are making progress by 
approaching this goal. More explicitly, they make progress either by accumulating more true 
beliefs about nature or by getting increasingly closer to the truth. On (S), we are going 
somewhere worth going, i.e., truth. We are also collecting something worth collecting, i.e., true 
beliefs (Cf. Godfrey-Smith 2007). What could be more epistemically worthy than truth? 
 
There are several objections to this picture of science. For present purposes, however, I 
simply wish to see how (S) fares when judged relative to actual scientific practices. As we have 
seen, scientists assess scientific progress on the basis of criteria that are literally epistemic, i.e., 
that have to do with knowledge rather than truth alone. More explicitly, scientists consider what 
was known before a certain discovery, and what is known as a result of that discovery, and if 
there is an increase in knowledge, then progress has been made. The naturalistic approach 
requires that a philosophical account of scientific progress be able to account for this scientific 
practice. 
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Truth is indeed epistemically worthy. Since knowledge entails truth, there can be no 
scientific knowledge without truth. In other words, if S knows that p, then p is true (although this 
does not mean that knowledge can be analyzed in terms of truth plus something else). However, 
if (S) were true, then, in addition to expecting scientists to talk about the aim of science in terms 
of truth and evaluate progress relative to the attainment of truth, we would also expect them to 
value truth alone regardless of methodology. In other words, if the aim of science is truth alone, 
then we would expect scientists to care about the truth, not about how they get to the truth (Cf. 
Bird’s second argument outlined in Section 1). As we have seen, however, this is not what we 
find. The case studies discussed above show that, as far as scientists are concerned, justification 
and methodology are as important as truth. In the case of Landsteiner, the methodological know-
how of antibody purification was deemed as important as the theoretical knowledge of blood 
groups. And, in the case of Pavlov, the surgical techniques he developed, such as the chronic 
experiment, were deemed as important as the theoretical knowledge of conditioned reflexes. 
 
From a naturalistic standpoint, then, one could make the following argument against (S): 
 
1. If (S) is true, then scientists would care only about the truth rather than ways of getting to 
the truth. [Assuming that scientists are thoughtful enough to reflect on the aim of their 
profession and make judgments about whether or not that aim is attained.] 
2. It is not the case that scientists care only about the truth rather than ways of getting to the 
truth. [As the aforementioned case studies show.] 
3. (Therefore) (S) is (probably) not true. 
 
Like any disconfirmation argument, this argument does not amount to a refutation of (S), even 
though it is formally valid. Proponents of (S) could always reject the assumption that scientists 
are cognizant of the aim of science and can make judgments about the attainment of that aim, but 
then they would have to say why scientists, unlike other professionals, fail to understand the aim 
of their profession (see footnote 9). 
 
On the other hand, one could make the following argument in support of (E): 
 
1. If (E) is true, then scientists would care about ways of getting to the truth, not merely 
about truth. [Assuming that scientists are thoughtful enough to reflect on the aim of their 
profession and make judgments about whether or not that aim is attained.] 
2. Scientists care about ways of getting to the truth (methodological knowledge). [As the 
aforementioned case studies show.] 
3. (Therefore) (E) is (probably) true. 
 
Like any confirmation argument, this argument does not amount to a demonstration that (E) is 
true, since it is formally invalid. Again, proponents of (S) could always reject the assumption that 
scientists are cognizant of the aim of science and can make judgments about the attainment of 
that aim. But it does seem to provide some evidence in support of (E), since (E) can readily 
explain why scientists care about ways of getting to the truth, whereas (S) does not seem to be 
able to account for that. 
 
5. Varieties of Scientific Knowledge 
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It seems to me that Baird and Faust (1990, p. 147) correctly point to the problem of focusing 
exclusively on theoretical truth in philosophy of science when they write: 
 
Philosophers speak of science in terms of theory and experiment. Yet when they speak of 
the progress of scientific knowledge, they speak in terms of theory alone. According to 
most philosophers, experiments are run in order to promote theory; improvements in the 
ability to experiment are merely instrumental goods that promote the final good of 
justifying the assertions of a wider and wider domain of sentences. Thus, according to 
most philosophers, improved theories account for the progress of scientific knowledge. It 
is our contention that this asymmetry is a mistake. Technicians, engineers and 
experimenters, in a vast number of instances, are able to make devices work with 
reliability and subtlety when they can say very little true, or approximately true, about 
how their devices work. Only blind bias would say that such scientists do not know 
anything about nature. Their knowledge consists in the ability to do things with nature, 
not say things about nature (original emphasis).
11
 
 
Using the example of the cyclotron, Baird and Faust show that experimental work in science 
sometimes proceeds largely without being illuminated or guided by theory because part of the 
reason for doing experimental work is to provide data that is the material of theoretical work. If 
this is correct, then (S), given its emphasis on theoretical truth, leaves out important aspects of 
science (i.e., experimentation, methodology, and practical applications) that scientists seem to 
take seriously when they evaluate progress. 
 
The case studies discussed above teach us that scientists evaluate scientific discoveries on 
the basis of the accumulation of knowledge of the following sorts: empirical, theoretical, 
practical, and methodological. For the most part, philosophers of science have focused on 
theoretical truth, while underestimating the importance that scientists attribute to empirical 
knowledge. As these case studies suggest, however, this sort of knowledge plays a role when it 
comes to evaluating discoveries in science. If a certain scientist is credited with having 
discovered something that was previously unknown, then that counts as progress, even if the 
discovery doesn’t involve a new elaborate theoretical framework like the ones philosophers of 
science often focus on (e.g., quantum mechanics). 
 
Another kind of knowledge of interest to scientists that is largely ignored by philosophers 
of science is practical knowledge (immediate and long-term practical applications). Kitcher, for 
instance, acknowledges practical progress as a goal of science. But then he sets it aside and goes 
on to give an account of cognitive progress. The problem, for Kitcher (1993, p. 92), is that “the 
notion of practical progress proves far more difficult than we might have thought.” However, I 
think that we can begin to make sense of it, in the larger context of scientific progress, from the 
standpoint of (E). That will allow us to account for the types of knowledge that scientists are 
interested in. To do so, however, we would have to give up a distinction that is common in 
                                                 
11
 Baird and Faust suggest that philosophers of science talk about knowledge, but when they do, it is theoretical 
knowledge exclusively. It seems to me, however, that Kitcher (2002, p. 385) rightly points out that, within the 
philosophy of science, “there is little explicit discussion of scientific knowledge.” 
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philosophy, but seems to be of no use when it comes to understanding scientific progress, 
namely, the distinction between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how to’. 
 
Ryle (1946; 1949) was perhaps the first to distinguish explicitly between ‘knowing that 
p’ (propositional knowledge) and ‘knowing how to A’ (knowledge of skills). Since then, it seems 
that philosophers have focused mostly on the former. As we have seen, however, practical and 
methodological knowledge (‘knowing how to’) seem to be of equal importance in science when 
it comes to assessing progress. When Landsteiner’s discovery of blood groups was evaluated by 
his peers and the Nobel Committee, they didn’t seem to consider the medical applications of his 
discovery as less (or more) important than the theoretical knowledge of blood types. 
Landsteiner’s contributions—theoretical, empirical, practical, and methodological—were judged 
equally as contributions to scientific knowledge. 
 
Moreover, on closer inspection, it seems that ‘knowing how to’ may simply be a species 
of ‘knowing that’, at least as far as scientific knowledge is concerned, involving propositional 
knowledge about methods of doing things. For example, suppose that John is getting a blood 
transfusion and the donor is Jane. Suppose that John has blood type O. In order to perform a safe 
blood transfusion, we have to know the blood type of Jane. In other words, knowing how to 
administer safe blood transfusions requires knowing that John has blood type O and that Jane has 
blood type O. 
 
When it comes to scientific knowledge, then, it may appear as if ‘knowing how to’ and 
‘knowing that’ are distinct kinds of knowledge. This appearance, however, may be misleading. 
According to Wilson (1996, p. 170): 
 
If the thesis that we make knowledge in virtue of our expressing this knowledge verbally 
were true, it ought to be true quite generally: we would make it true that humans cannot 
breathe underwater and that iron rusts when exposed to damp air. Yet no one tries to 
defend this thesis. The reason for the asymmetry is that we can conceive of non-verbal, 
action-guiding knowledge of the commonplace facts, whereas we cannot easily conceive 
of an inarticulate knowledge of the scientific facts; these appear to depend in some way 
not on the world but on our creation of words. But this impression is an illusion. We do 
not possess two distinct kinds of knowledge, one of which we make. Commonplace 
knowledge and scientific knowledge belong to the same species, and one aim of scientific 
praxis is to reduce the perceived distance between them (my emphasis). 
 
The same sort of illusion may be operative in the case of ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how to’ 
insofar as scientific knowledge is concerned. Indeed, when we realize that practical knowledge is 
a form of scientific knowledge, it becomes easier to conceive of action-guiding knowledge of 
scientific facts, as the aforementioned blood typing example seems to illustrate. This is not to 
say, of course, that the distinction between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how to’ is utterly 
useless. Rather, the suggestion is simply that it is not useful when it comes to understanding 
scientific knowledge, and thus scientific progress. Even if ‘knowing how to’ is not a species of 
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‘knowing that’,12 it still seems reasonable to suggest that the former involves cognitive capacities 
that can be reasonably seen as relevant to cognitive progress in science. In other words, if ‘to 
know’ is an achievement verb, then ‘knowing how to A’ seems no less an instance of cognitive 
success than ‘knowing that p’ (Adams 1958). 
 
According to Baird and Faust (1990), when most philosophers of science speak of 
scientific progress, they speak in terms of theory alone, and they neglect other aspects of science, 
such as experimentation, instrumentation, and methodology. They offer their diagnosis for the 
source of this mistaken asymmetry (Baird and Faust 1990, p. 148): 
 
Classically, knowledge has been analyzed in terms of true belief. While, perhaps, theories 
may be conceived as a species of belief, it is difficult to conceive of experiment as a 
species of belief. Experiment essentially involves the manipulation of bits of the world; 
belief may help direct the manipulation, but belief cannot take the place of this 
manipulation. When approached from the classical analysis of knowledge, it is hard to 
say exactly what is progressing, when speaking of the progress of experimental scientific 
knowledge (original emphasis). 
 
They urge a conception of scientific progress “broad enough to include the production of new 
scientific instruments and instrumental techniques” (Baird and Faust 1990, p. 148). They argue 
that “scientific knowledge consists of, among other things, scientific instruments and 
instrumental techniques, and not simply some kind of justified true beliefs” (Baird and Faust 
1990, p. 148). They also argue that scientific knowledge “consists in the ability to do things with 
nature, not say things about nature” (Baird and Faust 1990, p. 147). We can accommodate these 
insights, I suggest, by granting that know-how counts as scientific knowledge. Scientific 
knowledge, as the case studies discussed above suggest, consists in the cognitive abilities to do 
things with nature as well as say things about nature. This is how scientists conceive of scientific 
knowledge. To understand that, however, we need to give up the distinction between ‘knowing 
that’ and ‘knowing how to’, which may be useful in other ways, but not as far as understanding 
scientific knowledge, and hence scientific progress, is concerned. 
 
To this it might be objected that there are scientific fields that do not seem to have any 
practical applications, and thus no practical knowledge. It might appear as though fields like 
cosmology are inherently non-practical. In reply, I should make it clear that I am not saying that 
all scientific knowledge is know-how. Rather, I am saying that some scientific knowledge is 
know-how. In addition to know-how, i.e., practical and methodological knowledge, there is also 
scientific knowledge that is know-that, i.e., empirical and theoretical knowledge. 
 
Moreover, even in cosmology, which might appear to be the typical non-practical 
scientific field, it is not obvious that there are no concerns for practical applications at all. One 
example of a potential practical application in cosmology is time travel. This may seem 
farfetched, but cosmologists and astrophysicists are considering the possibilities of time travel.
13
 
                                                 
12
 Those who would point to natural language as a way to mark the distinction between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing 
how to’ should note that in French the verb savior is used in the sense of ‘to know that’ as well as ‘to know how’, 
whereas the sense of ‘being acquainted with’ is reserved for the verb connaitre. 
13
 See, e.g., Davies (2003) and Gott (2002). 
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By now, some of the alleged paradoxes of time travel have been shown to be harmless. For 
example, if we distinguish between “historical time” and “personal time,” there is no problem in 
saying that the time-traveler has gone back in “historical time,” not her “personal time.” In 
addition, it is often claimed that if time travel were possible, then one would be able to kill one’s 
parents and thereby prevent one’s own birth. In reply, however, it may be argued that, given that 
the time-traveler was born, no effect she has on the past can change that. In other words, time 
travel does not mean that the time-traveler has a license to change the past (Horwich 1987). Of 
course, none of this shows that time travel is physically possible. But this is precisely what 
cosmologists are trying to find out. One proposal, for example, is that time travel may be 
physically possible through wormholes in space-time. Gödel (1949) has shown that there are 
models of space-time that are consistent with general relativity and that allow time travel into the 
past.
14
 Whether or not time travel will be feasible remains to be seen. For present purposes, it is 
important to recognize that scientists are concerned with the potential practical applications of 
their work, even in fields like cosmology, in which it may not appear to be so at first glance. 
 
As for methodological progress (i.e., methods and techniques of learning about nature), 
according to Devitt (1984, p. 163), “not only are scientists learning more and more about the 
world, but also […] they are learning more and more about how to find out about the world.”15 
Like practical knowledge, methodological knowledge is also a form of know-how, i.e., knowing 
how to learn about nature. In cosmology, as well, there is a noticeable emphasis on 
methodological advancements. At the 1995 conference on “Key Problems in Astronomy and 
Astrophysics,” Allan Sandage, a student of Edwin Hubble (1889-1953) at the California Institute 
of Technology, introduced the term “Practical Cosmology.” It was an attempt to respond to the 
charge that cosmology was an “immature” scientific field with plenty of fascinating ideas but no 
substantial data to confirm them. To address this charge, Sandage and others thought that they 
must devote more attention to the methodological aspects of their work, specifically the ways in 
which astronomical observations are conducted and the ways in which data are gathered and 
analyzed. This was Sandage’s vision of practical cosmology, which was discussed recently in the 
international conference “Problems of Practical Cosmology” (Baryshev 2008): 
 
The advancement of cosmology is determined by the growth of observational data and 
[…] by the development of fundamental physical theories. Practical cosmology is the 
science which makes a link between observation and theory. The major goal of practical 
cosmology is to develop strategies for uncovering and attacking cosmological problems. 
Even with the wonderful advanced observational methods available, successful 
cosmological tests require that we know how to detect and handle different severe 
selection effects, which may be hidden both in data and, even seemingly secure, methods 
of data analysis (my emphasis).
16
 
 
Some of these strategies and methods include the “classical cosmological tests,” red-shift 
surveys, measurements of anisotropies of the cosmic background radiation by balloon and 
satellite (e.g., the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe) experiments, and fractal techniques. 
 
                                                 
14
 See also Pfarr (1981). 
15
 See also Kitcher (1993), p. 140. 
16
 Available at <http://ppc08.astro.spbu.ru/index.html>. 
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By being able to account for both cognitive and practical progress, (E) exhibits 
theoretical virtues, such as simplicity and unification. It is a simple view of progress because it 
accounts for the varieties of progress mentioned above by means of one concept. A revised 
concept of scientific knowledge, which includes not only propositional knowledge but also 
know-how, would allow us to account for these varieties of progress in a unified manner, 
incorporating both practical and cognitive progress. In that respect, (E) preserves what is useful 
and illuminating about (S), namely, that truth is necessary for progress, and incorporates it into a 
comprehensive view of scientific progress. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
According to Bird (2007, p. 65), “Given that science is an epistemic activity it seems almost 
tautologous to suggest that its success and so progress should be measured by epistemic 
standards.” On (E), knowledge, rather than truth alone, is the concept we need in order to 
understand scientific progress. (E) says that a scientific episode constitutes scientific progress 
precisely when it shows the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Bird shows that (E) and (S) 
diverge insofar as taking beliefs with insufficient epistemic support to count as knowledge is 
concerned. 
 
As far as accounting for scientific progress is concerned, (E) seems more promising than 
(S) insofar as it seems to be consistent with actual scientific practices. On (S), the scientific 
enterprise is a truth-aiming enterprise, and so we would expect to find that scientists talk about 
the aim of science in terms of truth, that scientists evaluate progress in science relative to criteria 
that have to do with truth alone, and that scientists care about truth alone rather than ways of 
getting to the truth. But this is not what we find. In fact, scientists talk about the aim of science in 
terms of knowledge, they evaluate progress relative to epistemic criteria, and they seem to value 
methodology as much as they value truth. These findings are consistent with (E), since according 
to (E), science is a knowledge-seeking enterprise. Scientific progress consists in the 
accumulation of scientific knowledge. (E) takes truth to be necessary (since knowledge is 
factive), but not sufficient, for scientific progress. In addition to truth, justification and reliable 
methods are also necessary for scientific progress.
17
 In that respect, unlike (S), (E) can account 
for actual scientific practices. Scientists not only conceive of the aims of science in epistemic 
terms but also assess scientific progress on the basis of epistemic criteria. 
 
I think that Bird is right about knowledge being the concept we need in order to 
understand scientific progress. But I also think that (E) needs to be revised in light of the 
aforementioned considerations. I propose to take seriously the lessons of the case studies 
discussed above. These are that (a) scientists take scientific knowledge to be the aim of scientific 
inquiry; (b) scientists make judgments about scientific progress based on the accumulation of 
scientific knowledge; (c) scientists take scientific knowledge to include not only theoretical 
knowledge but also empirical, practical, and methodological knowledge. Each contribution to 
scientific knowledge in terms of one of these types of knowledge counts as progress. Science 
                                                 
17
 By necessary and sufficient conditions here, I do not mean “individually necessary and jointly sufficient” as in 
conceptual analysis, but rather collectively sufficient for scientific progress, or better yet, constitutive criteria for 
progress. 
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advances owing to not only the grand scale theoretical frameworks of theoreticians but also the 
work of experimenters and data collectors, lab technicians, field workers, and the like. 
 
If this is correct, then we should revise (E) to include not only theoretical knowledge but 
also these other types of knowledge. We can do so, I suggest, if we grant that ‘knowing how’ 
(practical and methodological knowledge) is a species of ‘knowing that’ (theoretical and 
empirical knowledge). Even if it isn’t, it still seems reasonable to take advances in practical and 
methodological knowledge as instances of cognitive success, and hence cognitive progress, in 
science. Granted that practical and methodological knowledge both count as scientific 
knowledge, and hence that their accumulation counts as scientific progress, the revised epistemic 
account of scientific progress is the view that scientific progress is constituted by the 
accumulation of scientific knowledge. A scientific episode is progressive when it shows the 
accumulation of scientific knowledge, where scientific knowledge consists of each the following: 
empirical, theoretical, practical, and methodological knowledge. Each of these counts as 
scientific knowledge; the accumulation of each advances science. 
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